It's actually a well known fact around here . .. Just Google the three words "Muslim" "commerce" "Georgia" ... It's off of madinah road . . . nothing "illegal' about it though .. .
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French Style ISIS Attack, in Georgia?
- Thread starter IMaDad
- Start date
It's actually a well known fact around here . .. Just Google the three words "Muslim" "commerce" "Georgia" ... It's off of madinah road . . . nothing "illegal' about it though .. .
Jihadists are willing to wait a very long time before they take action, seems like they are building up for something epic. These terrorist live only for killing Westerners, it's war to them that they are willing to fight for 100s of years.
He informed his boss that he would quit his job if they ever tried to send him out to that place again.
I'm sure all the "alphabet agencies" already know about the place. It's pretty common knowledge around that area.
So this is one of how many communes, started in the '80s with known terrorist ties, recruiting and grooming a generation of now 20 to 30 somethings, taught para militaristic skills, with an estimate of 3000 members , that is no longer on Homeland's watch list because they have shown no activity? But isn't that what they do, they wait to be called upon even if it takes 30 years? I best stick my head back in the sand, way too troubling to think about it, 3000 members letting loose with AKs, pipe bombs, car bombs, suicide vestsHe informed his boss that he would quit his job if they ever tried to send him out to that place again.
I'm sure all the "alphabet agencies" already know about the place. It's pretty common knowledge around that area.
I would probably call 911 and try to get into a position of cover to see if I could help the officer. OP said they had AK's, which can turn cover into concealment in a nano second. Hand guns don't match up with long guns very well. I would do everything I could to help even if it means being a good witness.
HDD
HDD
Americans recruited from prison, get sent to Pakistan for further training, clear ties with terrorist leaders, well protected and funded, one goal(to kill Americans). They are American citizens therefore have rights. Only after they kill 14 innocents do they lose their rights. Muslims of the Americas membership boasts an estimate of 3000 who have the single goal of killing as many Americans as possible, they believe it's their path to The Holy Land. 3000 separate attacks, killing 14 or 100 innocents each time, not all at once, but over time, all traceable to these known camps, would that be enough to change our government's approach to these known camps?
Which way'd he Go!!
X infinity
Let me see some **** like that, ill put 2 to the chest and 1 between his running lights!
In the wake of the Nov. 13 attacks in Paris and the Nov. 20 attack against
the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, I have been fielding a lot of press
queries about countering the armed assault tactics used in both attacks
Since there seems to be so much interest in the topic, it seemed worthwhile
to discuss both government and personal responses to armed assaults in
this week's Security Weekly.
A Long History
First, it is important to realize that armed assaults employing small arms and
grenades have long been a staple of modern terrorism. Such assaults have
been employed in many famous terrorist attacks conducted by a wide array
of groups, such as the Black September operation against Israeli athletes at
the 1972 Munich Olympics; the December 1975 seizure of OPEC
headquarters in Vienna, Austria, led by Carlos the Jackal; the December
1985 simultaneous attacks against the airports in Rome and Vienna by the
Abu Nidal Organization; and even the December 2001 attack against the
Indian parliament building in New Delhi led by Kashmiri militants.
In a particularly brutal assault, Chechen militants stormed a school in
Beslan, North Ossetia, in September 2004, taking more than 1,000
hostages and booby-trapping the school with mines and improvised
explosive devices. The attack, standoff and eventual storming of the school
by Russian authorities after a three-day siege resulted in the deaths of more
than 320 people, half of them children.
More recently, we saw armed assaults used in the November 2008 Mumbai
attacks; the October 2014 attack against the Canadian National War
Memorial and Parliament in Ottawa, Canada; the January 2015 Paris
attacks against Charlie Hebdo and a kosher deli; and the July 2015 attack
against an armed forces recruitment center and a Navy reserve center in
Chattanooga, Tennessee.
In some instances, such as the December 1996 seizure of the Japanese
ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru, by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement, the objective of the armed assault is to take and intentionally
hold hostages for a long period. In other instances, such as the May 1972
assault on Lod Airport by members of the Japanese Red Army, the armed
assault is a suicide attack designed to kill as many victims as possible
before the assailants themselves are killed or incapacitated.
Many recent jihadist attacks have been the latter, and as such they more
closely resemble domestic active shooter situations than a barricade or
traditional hostage situation. Because of this, they must be responded to
differently.
Dealing With Armed Assaults
The long history of armed assaults in modern terrorism has compelled many
countries to develop specialized and highly trained forces to combat heavily
armed terrorists. For example, it was the failed rescue attempt of the Israeli
athletes in Munich that motivated the German government to create the
elite Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG 9), which would become one of the best
counterterrorism forces in the world. The activities of the Provisional Irish
Republican Army likewise helped shape the British Special Air Service into
its role as an elite counterterrorism force. Beyond national-level assets, the
threat of heavily armed criminals and terrorists has also contributed to the
development and widespread adoption of highly trained police, SWAT and
counterassault teams by many cities, states and other subnational
governments across the globe.
In traditional barricade or hostage situations, the most common tactical
response is for the first officers responding to the scene to establish a
perimeter to contain the incident. They then wait for hostage negotiators
and SWAT or other hostage rescue teams to arrive to handle the crisis. This
response is effective for a prolonged hostage situation. However, in the
second type of armed assault, it permits the attackers free rein to find and
kill many more victims inside the established perimeter. Many times, the
attackers are also suicidal and are not planning on surviving the incident.
In the United States, the April 1999 attack at Columbine High School in
Littleton, Colorado, was a watershed event that changed the way authorities
responded to the second type of armed assault. In the aftermath of
Columbine, officials learned that while the police established the perimeter
and waited, the two attackers continued to kill students inside the school.
Clearly while a shooter was actively killing people, the police could not just
sit back and wait for specialty forces to respond to the scene. Moreover,
since it often takes time for the specialized units to mobilize and respond,
such a delay can prove deadly.
Consequently, so-called active shooter protocols, which called for first
responding officers to quickly form a team and then engage and neutralize
the shooter as quickly as possible to save lives, were developed and
adopted. Active shooter protocols have required police officers to undergo
additional training and many police departments are now issuing officers
rifles or shotguns so that they do not have to face an active shooter
situation with a firepower disadvantage.
Stratfor has long said that ordinary police on patrol are an often overlooked
but critical facet of national counterterrorism defenses. While spotting
unusual behavior and conducting traffic stops are important, nowhere is the
role of regular police officers more important than in responding to active
shooter situations. Not only are street cops the most likely force to make
first contact with attackers, but in many cases they are also the primary
force called upon to stop them.
Officers employing active shooter protocols stopped attackers in the
Chattanooga shootings, and in the October 2015 Umpqua Community
College shooting in Roseburg, Oregon. In the Ottawa attack as well as the
May 2015 attack against a provocative event in Garland, Texas, security
personnel protecting the facility stopped the assailants. The police in
Colorado Springs, Colorado, also employed active shooter protocol in the
Nov. 27 shooting incident at a Planned Parenthood office. While one police
officer was killed and four others were wounded, their rapid response
undoubtedly saved lives.
Active shooter protocols rapidly spread to other First World countries
through training literature and conferences. However, as evidenced by the
2008 Mumbai attacks and the September 2013 attack against the Westgate
Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in which security forces did not take active shooter
counter actions and attackers were permitted to continue killing, it has taken
a bit longer to get to security forces elsewhere. That said, the Malian and
French special operations forces' actions during the Bamako attack and the
Afghan government's response to several armed assaults in Kabul highlight
that the concept is being spread to other governments through training
programs such as the U.S. State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program and its Department of Defense equivalent, as well as through
training provided by European and Australian forces.
In the United States, armed off-duty cops and civilians can also make a
difference in countering armed assaults. In February 2007, for example, a
heavily armed gunman who had killed five people in the Trolley Square Mall
in Salt Lake City, Utah, was confronted by an off-duty police officer, who
cornered the shooter and kept him pinned down until other officers could
arrive and kill the shooter. The off-duty officer's actions plainly saved many
lives that evening.
Individual Responses
But it is not just the authorities that need to respond to armed assaults.
Ordinary citizens also need to learn to quickly respond to danger. Properly
responding to danger actually begins well before the first shot is fired when
people adopt a mindset that recognizes the world is a dangerous place and
that they are ultimately responsible for their own safety.
Once a person understands the possibility of being targeted and decides to
adopt an appropriate level of situational awareness, he or she will be
mentally prepared to quickly realize that an attack is happening, something
security professionals refer to as attack recognition.
The earlier a person recognizes that an attack is developing, the better
chance he has to avoid it. But even once the attack has begun, a person
can still keep it from being a successful one by quickly recognizing what is
happening and getting away from the attack site by running or hiding — or
fighting back if they cannot run or hide.
However, once a person has recognized that an attack is taking place, a
critical step must be taken before he can decide to run, hide or fight: He
must determine where the gunfire or threat is coming from. Without doing
so, the victim could run blindly from a position of relative safety into danger.
I certainly encourage anyone under attack to leave the attack site and run
away from the danger, but one must first ascertain if he is in the attack site
before taking action. Many times, the source of the threat will be evident
and will not take much time to locate. But sometimes, depending on the
location — whether in a building or on the street — the sounds of gunfire
can echo, and it may take a few seconds to determine the direction it is
coming from. In such a scenario, it is prudent to quickly take cover until the
direction of the threat can be located. In some instances, there may even be
more than one gunman, which can complicate escape plans.
Fortunately, most active shooters are not well trained. They tend to be poor
marksmen who lack experience with their weapons. During the July 2012
shooting in Aurora, Colorado, James Holmes managed to kill only 12
people — despite achieving almost total tactical surprise in a fully packed
movie theater — because of a combination of poor marksmanship and his
inability to clear a jam in his rifle.
This typical lack of marksmanship implies that most people killed in active
shooter situations are shot at close range. Thus, it behooves potential
victims to move quickly to put as much distance between themselves and
the threat. Even the act of moving, especially if moving away at an angle,
makes one a much harder target for a poorly trained marksman to hit.
It is also important to think about and distinguish between concealment and
cover. Items that conceal, such as a bush, can hide you from the shooter's
line of vision but will not protect you from bullets the way a substantial tree
trunk will. Likewise, in an office setting, a typical drywall construction interior
wall can provide concealment but not cover, meaning a shooter will still be
able to fire through the walls and door. Still, if the shooter cannot see his or
her target, they will be firing blindly rather than aiming their weapon,
reducing the probability of hitting a target.
In any case, those hiding inside a room should attempt to find some sort of
additional cover, such as a filing cabinet or heavy desk. It is always better to
find cover than concealment, but even partial cover — something that will
only deflect or fragment the projectiles — is preferable to no cover at all.
There are many examples from the recent Paris and Bamako armed
assaults of people who ran away from the scene of the attacks and
survived. In the Bamako attack there were also many people who
barricaded themselves inside their hotel rooms and hid until the authorities
could rescue them. The August 2015 incident aboard a Paris-bound train
provided a good example of potential victims who were trapped aboard a
train car and fought back to end an armed assault.
Some people have mocked the simplicity of run, hide, fight. But as these
cases demonstrate, all three elements of this mantra can and do save lives.
the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, I have been fielding a lot of press
queries about countering the armed assault tactics used in both attacks
Since there seems to be so much interest in the topic, it seemed worthwhile
to discuss both government and personal responses to armed assaults in
this week's Security Weekly.
A Long History
First, it is important to realize that armed assaults employing small arms and
grenades have long been a staple of modern terrorism. Such assaults have
been employed in many famous terrorist attacks conducted by a wide array
of groups, such as the Black September operation against Israeli athletes at
the 1972 Munich Olympics; the December 1975 seizure of OPEC
headquarters in Vienna, Austria, led by Carlos the Jackal; the December
1985 simultaneous attacks against the airports in Rome and Vienna by the
Abu Nidal Organization; and even the December 2001 attack against the
Indian parliament building in New Delhi led by Kashmiri militants.
In a particularly brutal assault, Chechen militants stormed a school in
Beslan, North Ossetia, in September 2004, taking more than 1,000
hostages and booby-trapping the school with mines and improvised
explosive devices. The attack, standoff and eventual storming of the school
by Russian authorities after a three-day siege resulted in the deaths of more
than 320 people, half of them children.
More recently, we saw armed assaults used in the November 2008 Mumbai
attacks; the October 2014 attack against the Canadian National War
Memorial and Parliament in Ottawa, Canada; the January 2015 Paris
attacks against Charlie Hebdo and a kosher deli; and the July 2015 attack
against an armed forces recruitment center and a Navy reserve center in
Chattanooga, Tennessee.
In some instances, such as the December 1996 seizure of the Japanese
ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru, by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement, the objective of the armed assault is to take and intentionally
hold hostages for a long period. In other instances, such as the May 1972
assault on Lod Airport by members of the Japanese Red Army, the armed
assault is a suicide attack designed to kill as many victims as possible
before the assailants themselves are killed or incapacitated.
Many recent jihadist attacks have been the latter, and as such they more
closely resemble domestic active shooter situations than a barricade or
traditional hostage situation. Because of this, they must be responded to
differently.
Dealing With Armed Assaults
The long history of armed assaults in modern terrorism has compelled many
countries to develop specialized and highly trained forces to combat heavily
armed terrorists. For example, it was the failed rescue attempt of the Israeli
athletes in Munich that motivated the German government to create the
elite Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG 9), which would become one of the best
counterterrorism forces in the world. The activities of the Provisional Irish
Republican Army likewise helped shape the British Special Air Service into
its role as an elite counterterrorism force. Beyond national-level assets, the
threat of heavily armed criminals and terrorists has also contributed to the
development and widespread adoption of highly trained police, SWAT and
counterassault teams by many cities, states and other subnational
governments across the globe.
In traditional barricade or hostage situations, the most common tactical
response is for the first officers responding to the scene to establish a
perimeter to contain the incident. They then wait for hostage negotiators
and SWAT or other hostage rescue teams to arrive to handle the crisis. This
response is effective for a prolonged hostage situation. However, in the
second type of armed assault, it permits the attackers free rein to find and
kill many more victims inside the established perimeter. Many times, the
attackers are also suicidal and are not planning on surviving the incident.
In the United States, the April 1999 attack at Columbine High School in
Littleton, Colorado, was a watershed event that changed the way authorities
responded to the second type of armed assault. In the aftermath of
Columbine, officials learned that while the police established the perimeter
and waited, the two attackers continued to kill students inside the school.
Clearly while a shooter was actively killing people, the police could not just
sit back and wait for specialty forces to respond to the scene. Moreover,
since it often takes time for the specialized units to mobilize and respond,
such a delay can prove deadly.
Consequently, so-called active shooter protocols, which called for first
responding officers to quickly form a team and then engage and neutralize
the shooter as quickly as possible to save lives, were developed and
adopted. Active shooter protocols have required police officers to undergo
additional training and many police departments are now issuing officers
rifles or shotguns so that they do not have to face an active shooter
situation with a firepower disadvantage.
Stratfor has long said that ordinary police on patrol are an often overlooked
but critical facet of national counterterrorism defenses. While spotting
unusual behavior and conducting traffic stops are important, nowhere is the
role of regular police officers more important than in responding to active
shooter situations. Not only are street cops the most likely force to make
first contact with attackers, but in many cases they are also the primary
force called upon to stop them.
Officers employing active shooter protocols stopped attackers in the
Chattanooga shootings, and in the October 2015 Umpqua Community
College shooting in Roseburg, Oregon. In the Ottawa attack as well as the
May 2015 attack against a provocative event in Garland, Texas, security
personnel protecting the facility stopped the assailants. The police in
Colorado Springs, Colorado, also employed active shooter protocol in the
Nov. 27 shooting incident at a Planned Parenthood office. While one police
officer was killed and four others were wounded, their rapid response
undoubtedly saved lives.
Active shooter protocols rapidly spread to other First World countries
through training literature and conferences. However, as evidenced by the
2008 Mumbai attacks and the September 2013 attack against the Westgate
Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in which security forces did not take active shooter
counter actions and attackers were permitted to continue killing, it has taken
a bit longer to get to security forces elsewhere. That said, the Malian and
French special operations forces' actions during the Bamako attack and the
Afghan government's response to several armed assaults in Kabul highlight
that the concept is being spread to other governments through training
programs such as the U.S. State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program and its Department of Defense equivalent, as well as through
training provided by European and Australian forces.
In the United States, armed off-duty cops and civilians can also make a
difference in countering armed assaults. In February 2007, for example, a
heavily armed gunman who had killed five people in the Trolley Square Mall
in Salt Lake City, Utah, was confronted by an off-duty police officer, who
cornered the shooter and kept him pinned down until other officers could
arrive and kill the shooter. The off-duty officer's actions plainly saved many
lives that evening.
Individual Responses
But it is not just the authorities that need to respond to armed assaults.
Ordinary citizens also need to learn to quickly respond to danger. Properly
responding to danger actually begins well before the first shot is fired when
people adopt a mindset that recognizes the world is a dangerous place and
that they are ultimately responsible for their own safety.
Once a person understands the possibility of being targeted and decides to
adopt an appropriate level of situational awareness, he or she will be
mentally prepared to quickly realize that an attack is happening, something
security professionals refer to as attack recognition.
The earlier a person recognizes that an attack is developing, the better
chance he has to avoid it. But even once the attack has begun, a person
can still keep it from being a successful one by quickly recognizing what is
happening and getting away from the attack site by running or hiding — or
fighting back if they cannot run or hide.
However, once a person has recognized that an attack is taking place, a
critical step must be taken before he can decide to run, hide or fight: He
must determine where the gunfire or threat is coming from. Without doing
so, the victim could run blindly from a position of relative safety into danger.
I certainly encourage anyone under attack to leave the attack site and run
away from the danger, but one must first ascertain if he is in the attack site
before taking action. Many times, the source of the threat will be evident
and will not take much time to locate. But sometimes, depending on the
location — whether in a building or on the street — the sounds of gunfire
can echo, and it may take a few seconds to determine the direction it is
coming from. In such a scenario, it is prudent to quickly take cover until the
direction of the threat can be located. In some instances, there may even be
more than one gunman, which can complicate escape plans.
Fortunately, most active shooters are not well trained. They tend to be poor
marksmen who lack experience with their weapons. During the July 2012
shooting in Aurora, Colorado, James Holmes managed to kill only 12
people — despite achieving almost total tactical surprise in a fully packed
movie theater — because of a combination of poor marksmanship and his
inability to clear a jam in his rifle.
This typical lack of marksmanship implies that most people killed in active
shooter situations are shot at close range. Thus, it behooves potential
victims to move quickly to put as much distance between themselves and
the threat. Even the act of moving, especially if moving away at an angle,
makes one a much harder target for a poorly trained marksman to hit.
It is also important to think about and distinguish between concealment and
cover. Items that conceal, such as a bush, can hide you from the shooter's
line of vision but will not protect you from bullets the way a substantial tree
trunk will. Likewise, in an office setting, a typical drywall construction interior
wall can provide concealment but not cover, meaning a shooter will still be
able to fire through the walls and door. Still, if the shooter cannot see his or
her target, they will be firing blindly rather than aiming their weapon,
reducing the probability of hitting a target.
In any case, those hiding inside a room should attempt to find some sort of
additional cover, such as a filing cabinet or heavy desk. It is always better to
find cover than concealment, but even partial cover — something that will
only deflect or fragment the projectiles — is preferable to no cover at all.
There are many examples from the recent Paris and Bamako armed
assaults of people who ran away from the scene of the attacks and
survived. In the Bamako attack there were also many people who
barricaded themselves inside their hotel rooms and hid until the authorities
could rescue them. The August 2015 incident aboard a Paris-bound train
provided a good example of potential victims who were trapped aboard a
train car and fought back to end an armed assault.
Some people have mocked the simplicity of run, hide, fight. But as these
cases demonstrate, all three elements of this mantra can and do save lives.
