Knife Carry in Courthouses or Govt Buildings

[GAgunLAWbooklet]

Yeah, repeal by implication is disfavored. But, that's one way the courts take power away from the legislature. Or, how the legislature delegates its responsibility to the courts. Pass inconsistent laws, make new laws that contradict older laws without specifically naming them and formally announcing they're repealed, and just sit back and let the courts deal with it. If the Courts' application of statutory construction yields results that make the politicians happy, they take the credit. If the result in court is upsetting to the politicians and their constituents, then the legislators blame the judiciary.

QUOTE FROM GEORGIA SUPREME COURT in Oxford v. Carter (1961)

In the construction of a statute, all laws in pari materia should be considered in order to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Harrison v. Walker, 1 Ga. 32. A statutory rule must be construed consistently with the whole system of pleading and practice of which it forms a part. McDougald v. Dougherty, 14 Ga. 674.

*823 To the above rules on pari materia, Georgia has recognized, by way of obiter dictum, an exception. In Ryan v. Commissioners of Chatham County, 203 Ga. 730 (48 S. E. 2d 86), it was stated that statutes in pari materia could not be looked to where the language of the statute under consideration was clear and unambiguous.

In this case, however, that rule comes into conflict with other recognized and well-settled rules of statutory construction, viz.:

(1) Repeals by implication are not favored. Murray v. State, 112 Ga. 7 (37 S. E. 111); Cornwell v. Atlanta Trust Co., 177 Ga. 303 (170 S. E. 194); Moore v. State, 150 Ga. 679 (104 S. E. 907).

(2) The intention of the legislature is the cardinal guide to construction of statutes and, when plainly collected, should be carried into effect, though contrary to the literal sense of terms. Erwin v. Moore, 15 Ga. 361.

(3) Where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which would render it meaningless, the intention of the legislature should be construed so as not to render the statute absurd and ineffective. Stelling v. Richmond County, 81 Ga. App. 571 (59 S. E. 2d 414); Scott v. Mayor &c. of Mount Airy, 186 Ga. 652 (198 S. E. 693).

Thus, when a literal interpretation of a statute would have the effect of (1) repealing a prior statute by implication, and (2) rendering the statute under consideration meaningless, the court should consider all statutes in pari materia and attempt to reconcile and harmonize them whenever possible.

 

[Moe_Fugga]

16-11-127 says nobody (other than the exceptions in 16-11-130) can carry their firearms and knives (blade>12in) into a courthouse. Now... 15-16-10 says the sheriff with jurisdiction over a courthouse MUST create a comprehensive plan for security at the courthouse and it will be signed off by the chief judge. 16-11-136 says there can be rules against knives in place for courthouses and government buildings that are MORE restrictive than 16-11-127.

Basically, the sheriff (or his deputies) can tell you which knives you can or cannot bring into the courthouse based on their safety plan. Their rules may be more restrictive than 16-11-127.

 

[Moe_Fugga]

CQB27 is right about how Code section 16-11-136 says state preemption of local laws doesn't apply to knives at court houses or government buildings.

So even if the state law against guns and huge knives at those places (16-11-127) doesn't also ban normal sized knives, Code section ...136 said local ordinances could.

BUT, that law was passed in 2012 and has never been updated.

What about the 2015 amendments to Code section 16-11-173 that changed the reach and scope of Georgia's preemption law? The changes made that law cover any defensive weapon or tool --knives, clubs, tasers, pepper spray, whatever.

House Bill 492 not only told local government to keep their hands off of citizens' knives, but it was passed in 2015. That was three years after code section 136, and the 2015 law ended with the statement that any [current] laws in conflict with this new law are hereby repealed.

So... does Code ...136 still apply, or is it a dead letter law after the newer changes to Code ...173?

16-11-173 seems to be the state taking authority away from local entities to impose more restrictive rules against weapon ownership, sale, etc than the state has done already. For instance, this section states specifically that a local entity cannot REQUIRE heads of homes to possess a firearm. Or regulate weapons dealers in their jurisdiction any more than the state and feds already have. I don't believe the spirit of this statute is to supercede 16-11-136.

 

[GAgunLAWbooklet]

I think that 16-11-136 would be found to still be valid by the courts, despite the apparent and obvious contradiction with the great expansion of the state weapons-law preemption doctrine that came in a different Code section a few years later.

Why? Because 136 is more specific, with a narrower focus.
Instead of being a law about all weapons, it only talks about knives-- cutting instruments with blades.
And 136, by its own terms, singles out two specific kinds of places were preemption doesn't apply-- courthouses and government buildings. In contrast, 173 doesn't mention geography or the type of facility at all. So it would seem to apply everywhere. That's a general law, not focused.

“For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. ” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, (1998) (A pervert's actions shall not be deemed to violate the "child molestation law," which would require finding that a telephone converasation means "in the presence of" the child as required by the molestation law, when two other criminal laws (though with lesser penalties) perfectly describe the man's specific actions toward the child. Specific controls over the general, even if it benefits a pervert.)

 

[Tylerls1]

I’d leave it in the car, last time I went to courthouse in Macon they wouldn’t let me bring in my Glock key chain. That’s how silly they are

 

[Chatsworth]

Whitfield county you are NOT entering with anything metal..not even a belt buckle or your wristwatch on..

 

[letusbuyyourcar]

You can't even bring your phone into the Houston Co Courthouse or the City of Darien Courthouse. I understand people can be very rude and obnoxious with a damn phone. But the deputies and clerks all have theirs and hardly any phone etiquette.

 

[Moe_Fugga]

I think that 16-11-136 would be found to still be valid by the courts, despite the apparent and obvious contradiction with the great expansion of the state weapons-law preemption doctrine that came in a different Code section a few years later.

Why? Because 136 is more specific, with a narrower focus.
Instead of being a law about all weapons, it only talks about knives-- cutting instruments with blades.
And 136, by its own terms, singles out two specific kinds of places were preemption doesn't apply-- courthouses and government buildings. In contrast, 173 doesn't mention geography or the type of facility at all. So it would seem to apply everywhere. That's a general law, not focused.

“For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. ” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, (1998) (A pervert's actions shall not be deemed to violate the "child molestation law," which would require finding that a telephone converasation means "in the presence of" the child as required by the molestation law, when two other criminal laws (though with lesser penalties) perfectly describe the man's specific actions toward the child. Specific controls over the general, even if it benefits a pervert.)

Hines and Hunstein were right to dissent in that case. That is ****ed.

 

[jeep78]

If it is a gov't bldg and there is a metal detector in use, leave your knife with your gun at home or locked in car.

 

[BIKER13]

I think that 16-11-136 would be found to still be valid by the courts, despite the apparent and obvious contradiction with the great expansion of the state weapons-law preemption doctrine that came in a different Code section a few years later.

Why? Because 136 is more specific, with a narrower focus.
Instead of being a law about all weapons, it only talks about knives-- cutting instruments with blades.
And 136, by its own terms, singles out two specific kinds of places were preemption doesn't apply-- courthouses and government buildings. In contrast, 173 doesn't mention geography or the type of facility at all. So it would seem to apply everywhere. That's a general law, not focused.

“For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. ” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, (1998) (A pervert's actions shall not be deemed to violate the "child molestation law," which would require finding that a telephone converasation means "in the presence of" the child as required by the molestation law, when two other criminal laws (though with lesser penalties) perfectly describe the man's specific actions toward the child. Specific controls over the general, even if it benefits a pervert.)

go up to the forsyth county courthouse armed and let us know how it goes for you